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Abstract
The Unborn Victims of Violence Act' (UVVA) is a recent attempt by
pro-life forces to take a slice out of the constitutional protections
surrounding the right to choose.2 The UVVA is largely supported by prolife Republicans, although the vote in the House of Representatives was not
split entirely along party lines. 3

Opponents argue that the statute is a

* Juris Doctor, Washington and Lee University School of Law, May 2008; Bachelor
of Arts in Political Science, State University of New York at Buffalo, 2005. I would like to
thank Professor Ann Massie for all of her help and guidance in the writing process. I would
also like to thank my friend and former roommate Stephanie Wilson for sharing her
enthusiasm for women's rights with me.
1 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2005).
2. See id. (creating an offense for perpetrators of crimes against a pregnant woman
causing death or bodily injury to a child in utero for the death or injury to the child
separately and additionally to the penalty for the crime against the woman).
3. See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 31, Unborn Victims of Violence Act (Feb. 26,
2004), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2004/roll031.xml (last visited Dec. 18, 2008) (listing the
final vote in the house as 254 to 163 in favor of passage of the UVVA) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). Of voting Republicans, 207
voted in support of the bill, and 13 voted against it. Of voting Democrats, 47 voted in favor
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stealthy attack upon Roe v. Wade,4 as the statute establishes a legal status
for a fertilized egg, embryo, and fetus in the context of criminal
punishment.5
Proponents, however, countered that the statute
appropriately provides punishment to criminals who assault a pregnant
woman, validates the families of prenatal assault victims, and prevents
violence against women.6
In the course of the debate over the UVVA, Representative Lofgren
suggested a substitute bill that contained less aggressively pro-life
language.7 The Lofgren substitute, a counterproposal offered by the
Democrats, which was ultimately rejected, provided that injury to or
termination of a pregnancy resulted in a second crime.8 That portion was
the same as the UVVA; however, that second crime was an additionalcrime
against the pregnant woman, rather than a crime against a second victimi.e., the unborn entity-as in the UVVA. 9
of the bill compared to 149 who voted against the bill. Id.
4. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973) (holding that statutes criminalizing
abortion are violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if they create
only an exception for the abortion procedures to save the life of the mother without regard to
the pregnancy stage and without regard to other interests involved). In Roe, the Supreme
Court considered a facial challenge to the validity of Texas criminal abortion laws that
proscribe abortion except when required to save the mother's life. Id. at 117-18. The Roe
Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment protects a woman's right to abortion. Id. at
153-54. In so finding, the Court concluded that women enjoyed a broad right to terminate a
pregnancy at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and throughout most of the 19th
century. Id. at 140. The Court also noted that states have a legitimate interest in protecting
fetal life. Id. at 150. To determine the point at which the state's interest becomes
sufficiently compelling to overcome the mother's privacy interest, the Roe Court developed
a trimester framework. Id. at 162-64. Under this scheme the state had no compelling
interest in the first trimester of pregnancy, but after fetal viability the state's interests were so
compelling as to allow it to proscribe abortion. Id.
5. See 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 640 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Nadler) (citing several pro-life activists asserting their intention to pervade new legislation
with language of personhood in reference to pre-natal life for the purposes of establishing a
basis for one day overturning court decisions supporting abortion rights).
6. See id. at 639 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (stating that the purpose of the
UVVA is to provide validation for unborn victims of violence by allowing perpetrators of
such violence to be charged separately for the crime against the mother and that against the
unborn victim).
7. See id. (statement of Rep. Lowey) (stating that the Lofgren substitute is an
effective alternative to the proposed legislation, which achieves the same purpose without
employing suspect means).
8. See Motherhood Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 2247, 108th Cong. (2003)
(containing the "Lofgren Substitute," a bill identical to the UVVA in effect, but without use
of the term "child").
9. See id. (providing that injury to or termination of pregnancy resulted in a second
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L Introduction
[W]e have never in our history recognized a fetus as a separate legal
person. The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade specifically says we have
never recognized a fetus as a separate person.
...

If we were to do so, then we would get into the 14th amendment
question that you cannot deprive a person of life, or liberty or process,
without due process of law; and that is the purpose of this bill. That is
the purpose of similar bills in the State legislatures, I suspect, to give
underpinning to a future Supreme Court majority to say that we
recognize a fetus as a person within the meaning of the 14th amendment
and, therefore, abortion is murder and, therefore, Roe v. Wade is
overruled and, therefore, States have no right to legalize murder and you
a constitutional amendment to permit abortions in this
would need
0
country.'
Representative Jerrold Nadler made the above statement in voicing his
opposition to a proposed federal law giving prenatal entities" certain legal
the
rights. 12 The bill appears to contradict an important premise behind 13
constitutional right to seek an abortion: prenatal entities are not persons.

crime against the pregnant woman).
10. 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 643 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Nadler).
11. From this point on, when I refer to a prenatal entity, I am speaking in a broad
sense of all stages of a pregnancy prior to live birth. This includes all stages of pregnancy
from a zygote, to an embryo, to a fetus.
12. See 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 643 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Nadler) (expressing Rep. Nadler's desire to defeat the Unborn Victims of Violence bill).
13. See id. (arguing that the entire point of the bill is to undermine the rationale for
Roe v. Wade).
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The text of the bill, titled the "Unborn Victims of Violence Act of
2004," or "Laci and Conner's Law,' 14 was signed into law by the President
slightly under a year later. 15 The text of the act reads:
Sec. 1841. Protection of unborn children
(a)(1) Whoever engages in conduct that violates any of the provisions of
law listed in subsection (b) and thereby causes the death of, or bodily
injury (as defined in section 1365) to, a child, who is in utero at the time
the conduct takes place, is guilty of a separate offense under this section.
(2)(A) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the
punishment for that separate offense is the same as the punishment
provided under Federal law for that conduct had that injury or death
occurred to the unborn child's mother.
(B) An offense under this section does not require proof that
(i) the person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or
should have had knowledge that the victim of the underlying
offense was pregnant; or
(ii) the defendant intended to cause the death of, or bodily
injury to, the unborn child.
(C) If the person engaging in the conduct thereby intentionally
kills or attempts to kill the unborn child, that person shall instead
of being punished under subparagraph (A), be punished as
provided under sections 1111, 1112, and 1113 of this title for
16
intentionallykilling or attempting to kill a human being.

(D) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the death penalty
shall not be imposed for an offense under this section....
14.

See Carolyn Marshall, Jury Finds Scott Peterson Guilty of Wife's Murder, N.Y.

TIMEs, Nov. 13, 2004, at AlO. The UVVA bill, which had been introduced in 1999, was
reintroduced in Congress after the tragic murder of Laci Peterson and the subsequent death
of her fetus, which was to be named Conner. Id. The murder of Laci consumed media
attention for years after her disappearance in December 2002. Id. Laci was seven months
pregnant, and her husband, Scott, became a suspect. Id. The story unfolded as America
learned that Scott was living a double life: caring husband to Laci and boyfriend of massage
therapist, Amber Frey. Id. Prior to Laci's death, Scott had told Amber that he was a
widower. Id. He even went so far as to call Amber from a candlelight vigil for Laci, to tell
Amber that he was celebrating the New Year in Paris. Id. A few months later, Scott was

arrested for Laci's murder and was convicted in state court. Id. Note that even if the

Unborn Victims of Violence Act had passed prior to Laci's murder and the termination of
her pregnancy, Scott would not have been charged under the federal statute, as the state of
California had jurisdiction. Id.
15. See Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568
(2004) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2005)) (containing the date the statute was enacted).
16. Emphasis added.
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(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit the
prosecution(1) of any person for conduct relating to an abortion for
which the consent of the pregnant woman, or a person
authorized to act on her behalf, has been obtained or for
which such consent is implied by law;
(2) of any person for any medical treatment of the pregnant
woman or her unborn child; or
(3) of any woman with respect to her unborn child....
(d) As used in this section, the term 'unborn child' means a child in
utero, and the term 'child in utero' or 'child, who is in utero' means a
homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who
member of the species 17
is carried in the womb.
Proponents argue that the Act is completely unrelated to a woman's
right to an abortion because it excludes from the statute's punishment
conduct involving a consensual abortion.' 8 Opponents argue, however, that
the UVVA is intended to undermine Roe v. Wade, 19 the seminal case
providing that women have the right to seek an abortion. 20 They believe
that the true purpose of the UVVA is to undercut the constitutional right to
choose. 21 Representative Stephanie Jones believes that the UVVA:
...is the first step toward outlawing abortion. The real purpose of this
legislation is not to deter and punish criminal conduct but to erode the
This bill is a thinly veiled attempt to
reproductive rights of women.
22
undermine Roe v. Wade.
Opponents also believe that pro-life advocates are using a tragedy such
as the Laci and Conner Peterson story to advance their agenda.23
To bolster their arguments, opponents point to the debate surrounding
the UVVA, which was introduced by Republicans. In the course of the

17.

Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2005).

18. See 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 641 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner) (stating that the meaning of the UVVA does not encompass acts relating to a
consensual abortion).
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (providing a summary of Roe).
21. See supra note 3 (providing results of UVVA vote).
22. 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 658 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep. Jones).
23. See id. at 640 (statement of Rep. Nadler) (stating "the proponents of this bill are
taking what should be a straightforward issue and unnecessarily turning it into a
controversial one").
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debate, a counterproposal was offered by Representative Lofgren.2 4 The
Lofgren substitute was ultimately rejected, even though it served the same
purposes that the UVVA purportedly was meant to achieve.25 The
substitute did not, however, create any problems for the right to choose.2 6
The "Lofgren substitute," as it was commonly termed, named after the bill's
sponsor from California, was officially titled the "Motherhood Protection
Act of 2003. '27 It read as follows:
SEC. 2. CRIMES AGAINST A WOMAN THAT AFFECT THE
NORMAL COURSE OF HER PREGNANCY.
(a) Whoever engages in any violence or assaultive conduct against a
pregnant woman resulting in the conviction of the person so engaging
for a violation of any of the provisions of the law set forth in subsection
(c), and thereby causes an interruption in the normal course of the
pregnancy resulting in prenatal injury (including termination of the
pregnancy), shall, in addition to any penalty imposed for the violation,
be punished as provided in subsection (b).
(b) The punishment for a violation of subsection (a) is(1) if the relevant provision of law set forth in subsection (c) is set forth
in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of that subsection, a fine under title 18,
United States Code, or imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or
both, but if the interruption terminates the pregnancy, a fine under title
18, United States Code, or imprisonment for any term of years or for
life, or both; and
(2) if the relevant provision of law is set forth in subsection (c)(4), the
punishment shall be such punishment
(other than the death penalty) as
28
the court martial may direct.

As the first federal statute to include a prenatal entity in its definition
of "person," the UVVA raises many difficult questions regarding the future
of the right to choose. This is because the right to choose is based upon the
premise that a prenatal entity is not a person. 29 Proponents argued in the
24. See Motherhood Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 2247, 108th Cong. (2003)
(containing the text of the counterproposal).
25. See 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 640 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Lowely) (stating that the Lofgren substitute achieves the same ends as the UVVA without
the political means).
26. See id. (statement of Rep. Schakowsky) (stating that the Motherhood Protection
Act protects women as effectively as the UVVA without complicating the right to choose).
27. See H.R. 2247 (stating that the official title of the "Lofgren Substitute" is the
"Motherhood Protection Act of 2003").
28. Id.
29. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (stating that because the text of the
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congressional debates that because prenatal entities are given personhood
only in the context of a particular criminal statute, the statute does not
suggest an undermining of Roe's guarantee of the right to seek an
abortion. 30 As Representative Sensenbrenner repeatedly noted during the
31
congressional debates, "this bill... has nothing to do with abortion.',
Despite the Congressman's assurances, there are a number of reasons why
opponents are suspicious that the statute's intent is actually about abortion.
For example, Senator Orrin Hatch admitted in a statement to CNN that
"[opponents of the bill] say it undermines abortion rights. It does, but that's
irrelevant.' '32 In addition, the executive director of the Christian Legal
Society told the Los Angeles Times that:
[i]n as many areas as we can, we want to put on the books that the
embryo is a person. That sets the stage for a jurist... to acknowledge
that human beings at any stage of development deserve protection, even
protection 33that would trump a woman's interest in terminating a
pregnancy.
In light of this factual background, it seems that the UVVA's true
purpose is, in fact, to undermine the constitutional protections surrounding
reproductive rights. Even if it were true, however, that the UVVA's
proponents had no intention of overturning Roe, the statute still lays the
foundation for establishing the notion that if a prenatal entity is a person,
then it has the right to life that cannot be deprived without due process. 34 In
the eyes of the law, there would be two persons, both with equal rights.35
The woman who may wish to terminate the pregnancy by exercising her
Constitution contains no explicit case where "person" has a prenatal application, and because
in the Nineteenth Century legal abortion practices were freer than today leads the Court to
believe that "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment does not include the unbom).
30. See 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 646 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner) (stating that the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld fetal homicide laws
and two-victim crime laws).
31. Id. at 639.
32. See 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 640 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Nadler) (citing the statement of Senator Orrin Hatch).
33. Aaron Zitner, Abortion Foes Attack Roe on New Research, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
2003, at Al (quoting Samuel Casey, the then executive director of the Christian Legal
Society).
34. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 156 (stating that if a fetus is afforded personhood, then its
right to protection from abortion is guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment).
35. See 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 640 (statement of Rep. Nadler) (explaining that
once the law recognizes a fetus as a legal person, the law must also recognize and protect the
rights of that person).
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right to liberty is the first, and the second is the prenatal entity, which
presumably wants to exercise its right to life. How then does the law
choose which person has the greater right?
To answer this question, imagine a hypothetical situation where two
children exist: one is six, the other is three.36 If you were forced to choose,
which one of these children should die? Which child has the lesser rights
and thus would be sacrificed? How could one choose? Certainly, no one
would be able to choose which of two living beings had greater rights and
thus should be spared. Now imagine a situation where there are again two
entities, the six-year-old and this time, a fetus (or perhaps an embryo or
even a fertilized egg). Which one of these has greater rights and will be
spared? Would anyone actually argue that the fetus has rights equal to the
living child and thus, that the child should die? I believe that I would be
hard-pressed to find a person who would sacrifice the six-year-old so that
an unborn entity would have the potentiality of life. While this situation is
unlikely ever to occur, it does strike a note of similarity to the example
above where the woman wants to terminate her pregnancy and the prenatal
entity presumably would like to live. The UVVA suggests a future where
there is a necessity of choosing which entity has greater rights by including
prenatal entities in its definition of "person."
II. Comparison of UVVA and the Lofgren Substitute
This note explores the impact that the recently enacted federal law and
similar state laws may have on reproductive rights. For many years,
proponents have attempted to chip away at the right to seek an abortion, and
a federal fetal homicide statute like the UVVA is merely the latest attempt
to overturn Roe.37 Fetal homicide statutes provide punishment for criminal
interference with a pregnancy.38 Although the federal statute is a recent

36. See Ann MacLean Massie, Professor of Law at the Washington and Lee
University School of Law, Reflections on Hadley Arkes' Natural Rights and the Right to
Choose, Cumberland School of Law (Nov. 7, 2003) (stating a similar hypothetical with
separate deductions from the author) (transcript available in the Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice archives at Washington and Lee University School of Law).
37. See Alison Mitchell, House Approves Bill Criminalizing Violence to Fetus, N.Y.
TiMEs, Apr. 27, 2001, at Al (discussing the use of an incremental strategy by abortion
opponents).
38. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2004) (making fetal injury and fetal homicide
independent federal crimes).
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enactment, states have used similar statutes for many years. 39 Their forms
differ from state to state with respect to the crime charged for interfering
with a pregnancy, but all provide vindication to the devastated families who
have suffered the unexpected loss of the potential child and perhaps also the
pregnant woman. 4° States enacting statutes similar to the UVVA have
made arguments based on morality and emotion to gain support for their
legislation. Many of these statutes endow a prenatal entity with rights equal
to that of a woman, as victims of certain crimes of violence.4' As such,
these laws are the latest steps of the pro-life movement's effort to overturn
the Supreme Court's guarantee of the right to choose. Although there are
states that refuse to enact these laws, the number dwindles with each
passing day.42 Statutes like this value the right to choose,
yet still provide
43
comparable protection for women against violent attacks.
Comparing the UVVA to the Lofgren substitute, one can see that the
Lofgren substitute, like the UVVA, recognizes that a woman suffering the
non-consensual termination of her pregnancy endures a loss. 44 Both bills
also recognize that an assailant who causes a miscarriage or prenatal injury
deserves punishment beyond that imposed for the underlying crime, i.e., the
assault on the woman alone.45 In addition, the UVVA and the Lofgren
substitute apply to the same original crimes: "The bill[s] identif[y] 68
existing Federal laws dealing with acts of violence and expands them to
include harm to... [a prenatal entity.] '"46 The UVVA, however, provides
39. See 150 CONG. REc. H644 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 2004) (statement of Rep. Steams)
(noting passage of similar laws in twenty-nine states).
40. See Fetal Homicide Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/fethom.htm#
State%20Law (last visited Dec. 18, 2008) (listing various state fetal homicide statutes with
differences) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
41. See id. (listing state laws that give prenatal entity rights).
42. See 150 CONG. Rc. H637-05, 644 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Steams) (noting that the number of states that have passed laws recognizing two victims in
crimes against pregnant women is increasing).
43. See Motherhood Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 2247, 108th Cong. (2003)
(providing that those who attack a pregnant woman and affect her pregnancy will be
punished).
44. See Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2004) (providing
additional punishment for disruption of pregnancy); Motherhood Protection Act of 2003,
H.R. 2247, 108th Cong. (2003) (same).
45. See 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2004) (including disruption of pregnancy in the description
of the crime in addition to the assault); Motherhood Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 2247,
108th Cong. (2003) (same).
46. 150 CONG. Rac. H577 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 2004) (statement of Rep. Pitts).
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that an assault upon a pregnant woman is a two-person crime if prenatal
injury or termination results.47 The Lofgren substitute does not involve a
two-victim crime, but it does provide that there are two crimes. 48 Both
crimes are against the woman: the first for the underlying crime, and the
second for interfering with her constitutional right to choose: i.e., the right
to carry a child to term without interruption. 49 The most important
difference is that the Lofgren substitute, unlike the UVVA, does not endow
the fetus with any kind of personhood status.5 ° In fact, the Lofgren
substitute
does not mention any legal entity in addition to the pregnant
51
woman.

Opponents of the UVVA are concerned that the statute, as pointed out
by Representative Nadler, establishes "the foundation for laws that would
criminalize abortion because, after all, if the fetus is a person, then abortion
is murder." 52 Such a foundation leads logically to the rejection of the
central propositions in Roe-(i) that a fetus is not a person and (ii) that the
pregnant woman has superior rights to life and liberty.53 The Roe
propositions allow a woman to use her superior rights to choose to
terminate her pregnancy, subject to the litany of limitations, which the case
and its progeny impose.
During debates in the House of Representatives, proponents of the
Unborn Victims of Violence Act argued that the bill serves several
purposes.5 5 First, it punishes assailants who cause injury or death to a

47. See 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2004) (establishing an unborn child as a legally protected
entity where assault upon a pregnant woman which results in prenatal injury is classified as a
two-person crime).
48. See Motherhood Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 2247, 108th Cong. (2003)
(providing that punishment for interrupting normal course of pregnancy would be imposed
in addition to punishment for an attack).
49. See id. (establishing two crimes without classification of the unborn child as a
legally protected entity, thus providing that both crimes are committed against the woman).
50. See id. (providing that additional punishment would occur as result of crimes
against the woman for causing injury to or termination of her pregnancy).
51. See id. (excluding the "child" as a legal entity).
52. 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 652 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Nadler).
53. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (stating that the right of privacy founded in
the Fourteenth Amendment includes a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy).
54. See 150 CONG. REc. H637-05 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2006) (noting that Roe did not
recognize an unborn child as a separate legal entity, giving a woman superior legal rights
and ability to terminate pregnancy).
55. See id. (describing multiple reasons for enacting the bill).
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potential, desired child.56 Prior to the passage of the statute, one
representative passionately argued that, "[u]nder current federal law, if a
criminal assaults or kills a pregnant woman and causes death or injury to
her unborn child, they face no consequences for taking or injuring that
unborn life. , 57 Many Americans, especially after the tragic unfolding of the
Laci and Conner Peterson story, felt that it was unfair for assailants to
escape punishment for causing the termination of a woman's pregnancy.58
Groups which had for years been advocating passage of the UVVA saw the
change in public opinion as an opportunity. 59 The UVVA had appeared
twice before in the Congress, beginning in 1999, where it passed the House
of Representatives twice, and twice stalled when the Senate failed to act.60
In the aftermath of the tragic murder of Laci Peterson, the legislation was
reintroduced. 61 Pro-life advocates-including victims (and their families)
of violence who had miscarried as a result of the attacks-became involved
in urging the passage of the UVVA.62
Although public opinion in the country may have been changing, not
all legislators were initially supportive of the bill.63 Sharon Rocha (Laci
Peterson's mother), Tracy Marciniak, 64 and other victims and families of
56. See id. (establishing punishment under the proposed bill).
57. 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 644 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Collins).
58. See 149 CONG. REc. H4018 (daily ed. May 14, 2003) (statement of Rep. Smith).
("[I]n a recent Fox News-Opinion Dynamics poll, 84 percent said that homicide charges are
appropriate in the deaths of Laci Peterson and her unborn son Connor in the muchpublicized Peterson murder case in California; only 7 percent said that a single homicide
charge would be appropriate.").
59. See 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 644 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Steams) (discussing broad public support for two victim crime legislation).
60. See id. (statement of Rep. Lee) (noting the legislative history of the bill).
61. See Sheryl G. Stolberg, Washington Talk: From CNN to Congress, Legislation by
Anecdote, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2003, at A26 (stating that the Peterson case provided impetus
for the bill).
62. See National Right to Life, http://www.nrlc.orgfJnbornVictims/familyprofiles.
html (last visited Dec. 18, 2008) (listing families advocating passage of UVVA) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
63. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
64. Tracy Marciniak is a woman who was due to give birth in four days to a child
which she and her husband intended to call Zachariah. That night, her husband flew into a
rage, and decided that he would terminate her pregnancy and beat Tracy severely. Tracy
was severely injured and nearly killed. During the attack, the fetus died. Because there was
no law imposing additional punishment for causing a miscarriage, Tracy's husband was
convicted only of assault upon Tracy. See Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2003 or Laci
and Conner's Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 25-26 (July 8, 2003) [hereinafter House Hearings on UVVA]
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those suffering a criminal interference with a pregnancy may have
persuaded those reluctant legislators.6 5 It was even rumored that they
threatened hesitant congresspersons with adverse publicity if they did not
vote in support of the bill.66 In addition, many pro-life groups became
involved in pressuring legislators to support the UVVA.67 Focus on the
Family noted that the testimony of Laci Peterson's mother was
"compelling" and "deserve[d] much of the credit for" the bill's passage. 68
This accumulation of events led legislators to reintroduce the bill into
Congress, feeling confident that they could finally pass the UVVA.69
The Lofgren substitute also reflected a desire to punish assailants who
interfered with a woman's pregnancy. 70 However, the text of the substitute
consciously failed to mention a prenatal entity, an omission that UVVA71
proponents used to emphasize the substitute amendment's inferiority.
They argued that by failing to discuss the prenatal entity, the Lofgren
substitute impliedly disregarded the loss of the potential child.72 UVVA
(testimony of Tracy Marciniak), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/
judiciary/hju88204.000/hju88204_0f.htm (describing the incident to Congress).
65. See Washington Talk, supra note 61, at A26 (discussing the effect of the Peterson
case on legislators).
66. See Sharon Rocha, Statement by Sharon Rocha-February 26, 2004, National
http://www.nrlc.orgfUnbomVictims/
26,
2004),
(Feb.
Life
Right
to
RochaStatementtext.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2008) (stating a willingness to inform voters
of the anti-UVVA stances of politicians) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice).
67. See generally National Right to Life Homepage, http://www.nrlc.org/Unborn
Victims/index.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal
of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Citizen Link: Senate Passes Unborn Victims of Violence
Act, http://www.citizenlink.org/CLFeatures/A000000486.cfm (last visited Dec. 18, 2008)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops, http://www.usccb.org/prolife/issues/abortion/
victims.shtml (last visited Dec. 18, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of
Civil Rights and Social Justice).
68. Citizen Link: Senate Passes Unborn Victims of Violence Act, http://www.citizen
link.org/CLFeatures/A000000486.cfm (last visited Dec. 18, 2008) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
69. See Washington Talk, supra note 61, at A26 (noting that the bill's chief Senate
sponsor believed that the Peterson case created new life for the UVVA).
70. See id. (describing the Lofgren substitute's additional punishment for disrupting
pregnancy).
71. See 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 660 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Brady) (noting that the Lofgren substitute does not recognize two victims even when the
unborn child was the intended target of violence).
72. See id. (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (asserting that the absence of language
referring to the prenatal entity does not give proper recognition to the unborn child).
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proponents lauded the supremacy of the UVVA because of its symbolic
gesture to families who had suffered the loss of an undesired abortion. 7
Lofgren substitute proponents argued that even though the bill failed to
mention a prenatal entity, it still provided enhanced punishment for an
assailant who caused the termination of a pregnancy.7 4 They maintained
that they were just as dedicated as UVVA supporters were to providing
additional punishment for assailants who caused interference with women's
pregnancies.7 5 To demonstrate, the Lofgren substitute provided penalties
equal to or harsher than the penalties provided by the UVVA.76 The crime
for which the assailant was punished was the important distinction between
the two bills. Although the UVVA treats the assault as against a second
victim, i.e., the prenatal entity, the Lofgren substitute treated the second
crime as against the woman, "because her interest in carrying that
pregnancy to term and bearing a healthy baby is assaulted."7 7 Because both
bills punished assailants equally, it appeared that the UVVA actually
represented a conscious plan to undermine or pave the way to overruling
Roe.
The second purpose for enacting the UVVA was a congressional
desire to provide recognition to the families of "unborn victims of
violence. 7 8 Proponents wanted to acknowledge that the crime was a twoperson, rather than a one-person, crime. 79 Families who felt that a person
had died when the assailant caused the non-consensual termination of the
pregnancy wanted validation for their feelings of loss. 80 Those families

73. See id. (stating that the families of victims seek recognition of the unborn child as
a victim).
74. See id. at 666 (statement of Rep. Jackson) (noting that the substitute provided for a
separate offense with greater punishment).
75. See id. at 641 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep. Nadler) (noting that
opponents of UVVA recognize the heinous nature of the crime).
76. Compare Motherhood Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 2247, 108th Cong. (2003)
(providing a punishment of up to a life sentence for an attack resulting in termination of
pregnancy), with Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2004)
(providing a punishment for causing injury or death of an unborn child equal to that of
causing injury or death of the mother).
77. 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 641 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.

Nadler).
78. See id. at 639 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (discussing the belief held by an
attacked woman's family that there were two victims).
79. See id. at 641 (statement of Rep. Nadler) (describing grief felt by families of
victims).
80. Id.
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were expecting the birth of a child. 8' The pregnant women had eagerly
anticipated a new baby. 82 The assault ended that expectation and
anticipation. 3 The assailant injured the pregnant woman, perhaps causing
her death, and caused injury to or termination of her pregnancy. 84 When the
woman miscarried, many of the families grieved as if a person had died. 5
To them, the prenatal entity was as real as a living person.86 As
Representative Sensenbrenner stated:
18-year-old Ashley Lyons and her unborn son, Landon, were murdered
in Scott County, Kentucky. Current Kentucky law regards this crime as
having only a single victim. But Carol Lyons, Ashley's mother and
Landon's grandmother, said, "Nobody can tell me that there were not
two victims. I placed Landon in his mother's arms, wrapped in a baby
blanket that I had sewn for him, just before87I kissed my daughter goodbye for the last time and closed the casket."
After hearing stories like this, many legislators wanted to recognize
that a loss was sustained and that a person had died.88
Although the Lofgren substitute addressed all of the other concerns
dealt with by the UVVA, the substitute did not address this issue as
adequately as the pregnant assault victims' families wanted. 89 Because the
substitute did not mention any prenatal entity, its additional punishment
was not for ending the life of a second victim. 90 Yet, the Lofgren substitute
did discuss the assailant's impact on the pregnant woman, the true victim in
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id.

84.

Id.

85. Id.
86. See id. (noting that families of assaulted pregnant women considered there to be
two victims).
87. Id. at 639 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
88. See id. (discussing the importance of recognizing family's feelings).
89. See e.g., House Hearingson UVVA, supra note 64 (testimony of Tracy Marciniak)
(explaining that her unborn son was also the victim of a crime). Marciniak testified:
I know that some lawmakers and some groups insist that there is no such thing
as an unborn victim and that the crimes like this only have a single victim. But
this is callous, and it is wrong. Please don't tell me that my son was not a real
victim of a real crime. We were both victims, but only I survived.
Id.
90. See 147 CONG. REc. H1640 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 2006) (statement of Rep. Lofgren)

("This bill [the Lofgren substitute] focuses on the harm to the pregnant woman and provides,
we hope, a deterrence of violence against women and provides very tough penalties when
that violence results in injury to the fetus or a miscarriage.").

UNBORN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE ACT
the assault. 91 It is her expectation of childbearing that is victimized when
the assailant causes injury to or termination of her pregnancy. Should she
survive the attack, she will likely be the one suffering. Thus, it seems
appropriate that because she suffered the criminal assault and then the nonconsensual termination of her pregnancy, her injury should be the one that
the statute symbolically recognizes. Rather than providing validation to
neutral and
grief-stricken families, perhaps the law should remain
92
unsympathetic; after all, we do expect justice to be blind.
Finally, proponents believed that the UVVA would reduce violence
against women, and particularly, pregnant women. 93 Violence against
pregnant women is a considerable problem, evidenced by statistics that
show that the most common way for a pregnant woman to die is by
homicide. 94 Because the statute does not require intent to cause injury to
anyone other than the woman, 95 proponents reasoned that a would-be
91. See Motherhood Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 2247, 108th Cong. §2 (2003).
Whoever engages in any violent or assaultive conduct against a pregnant woman
resulting in the conviction of the person so engaging for a violation of any of the
provisions of law set forth in subsection (c), and thereby causes an interruption
to the normal course of the pregnancy resulting in prenatal injury (including
termination of the pregnancy), shall, in addition to any penalty imposed for the
violation, be punished as provided in subsection (b).
Id
92. See Jesse Allen, Comment, Blind Faith and Reasonable Doubts: Investigating
Belief in the Rule of Law, 24 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 691, 709 ("The familiar image of blind
Justice may provide a clue to the primacy of constraint in our legal system. Justice's
blindfold is generally interpreted as symbolizing the notion that the law's application of
objective reason produces results untainted by subjective sympathies, fears, likes, and
dislikes.").
93. See 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 645 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Garrett) ("This legislation is commonsense. Once passed, it will work to deter violence
against women and their unborn children as well.").
94. See id. at 654 (statement of Rep. Watson) (noting that "[tlhe statistics are shocking
but true: The leading cause of death of pregnant women is murder"); see also Diana Cheng
& Isabelle Horon, Enhanced Surveillance for Pregnancy-AssociatedMortality-Maryland,
1993-1998, J.OF ThE AM. MED. Assoc., Mar. 21, 2001, Vol. 285, No. 11, 1455, 1457
(reporting the results of a study conducted in Maryland on deaths of pregnant women
between 1993 and 1998, finding that "[t]he leading cause of pregnancy-associated death was
");Donna St. George, Many New or Expectant Mothers Die Violent Deaths,
homicide ....
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 19, 2004, at A01 (discussing the statistics from Maryland that

point to homicide as the leading cause of pregnancy-associated death and highlighting that
this may be a nationwide trend but that statistics are as yet unknown in other states that do
not record reproductive status at time of death).
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2004) ("An offense under this section does not require
proof that... the defendant intended to cause the death of, or bodily injury to, the unborn
child.").
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assailant would be less likely to harm a woman for fear that he could be
charged with two crimes. 96 Because almost any woman (ranging in age
presumably from 10 to 60) could be pregnant, a would-be assailant would
be unable to guarantee that the woman was not pregnant.
Although all members of Congress supported the goal of reducing and
preventing violence against pregnant women, opponents showed that it
seemed that the proponents were not as concerned with preventing violence
against women as they purported to be.97 Opponents argued that ulterior
motives were behind the campaign for the UVVA.98 Many proponents of
the UVVA had blemished records with respect to support for the federal
Violence Against Women Act, 99 a program clearly meant to prevent
violence against women. Many who were now arguing that the UVVA
must be passed to prevent violence against women had not made similar
arguments for the Violence Against Women Act in the past. 1°° As
Representative Nadler quipped, "it appears that many of the Members who
have signed on to this bill [the UVVA] are the same ones who voted to
divert funds from protecting women from violence to protecting stock
dividends from taxation." 101
Opponents showed that they did not believe that the UVVA was the
10 2
best way to achieve the goal of reducing violent attacks against women.
Groups that work to stop violence against women also believed that the

96. See 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 644 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Stearns) ("In terms of our criminal justice system, it's clear that this law will serve as a
deterrent to future attacks on women of childbearing age.").
97. See id. at 655 (statement of Rep. Stark) ("Let's be clear, this bill will not help
address the serious issue of violence against women, which affects nearly one in every three
women during their adulthood.... In fact domestic violence organizations... oppose this
legislation.").
98. See id. at 640 (statement of Rep. Nadler) (arguing that the real motive behind
enacting the UVVA was to undermine existing abortion law and not to protect pregnant
women).
99. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. §13981 (1994), held
unconstitutionalby U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (stating that Congress' effort
in § 13981 to provide a federal civil remedy for violence against women was
unconstitutional both under the Commerce Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
100. See 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 640 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Nadler) (arguing that the Congress members supporting the Unborn Victims of Violence Act
had previously voted to divert funds away from protecting women against violence).
101. Id.
102. See id. at 640 (statement of Rep. Nadler) (arguing that the Lofgren substitute could
achieve the goal of protecting pregnant women without inserting abortion politics into the
debate).

UNBORN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE ACT
10 3
UVVA was not an effective solution, and thus, did not support the bill.
One group's opposition, that of the National Coalition Against Domestic
Violence, was even more significant when one notes that the group takes no
position on abortion. °n That showed that the statute's impact on
reproductive rights has no bearing on the group's conclusion as to the
UVVA's effectiveness. 0 5 Judy Fulcher, the Public Policy Director of the
Coalition, testifying before Congress, noted that "[t]he "UVVA" is not
designed to protect women. The goal of the Act is to create a new cause of
action on behalf of the unborn. The result is that the crime committed
woman is no longer about the woman victimized by
against a pregnant
06
violence."1
Although the Lofgren substitute was not as strong a deterrent as the
Violence Against Women Act, the substitute likely had some deterrence. 0 7
Some legislators hoped that would-be assailants would think twice before
harming a woman for fear that if she is pregnant, he could be charged with
two crimes.'0 8 If an assailant is willing to face the risk, however, that he
will be punished for injuring one victim, the woman, then he will probably
be just as undeterred at the risk of facing punishment for an additional
victim. More importantly, the Lofgren substitute recognizes that an assault
upon a pregnant woman is just that-an assault upon the woman. 109 While
the fetus is indirectly harmed, the woman experiences the direct assault.
The UVVA's disregard for the pregnant woman's personal dignity is a

103. See id. at 655 (statement of Rep. Stark) (pointing to the fact that groups such as the
National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, which does not take a position on abortion,
oppose the Unborn Victims of Violence Act).
104. See generally National Coalition Against Domestic Violence Homepage,
http://www.ncadv.org/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2008).
105. See id. at 655 (statement of Rep. Stark) ("In fact, domestic violence organizations,
like the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence-that do not take positions on
abortion-oppose the legislation [the UVVA].").
106. House Hearingson UVVA, supra note 64 (testimony of Juley Fulcher, Esq., Public
Policy Dir. of the Nat'l Coalition Against Domestic Violence).
107. See 150 CONG. REC. H637-05, 655 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Farr) (arguing that the Lofgren substitute would have created a separate federal offense for
violence against a pregnant woman that results in the termination or interruption of her
pregnancy, and would thus prevent crimes against pregnant women).
108. See id. at 644 (statement of Rep. Steams) (stating "[i]n terms of our criminal
justice system, it's clear that this law will serve as a deterrent to future attacks on women of
childbearing age").
109. See id. at 655 (statement of Rep. Farr) ("[T]his substitute [the Lofgren substitute]
creates a new, separate federal offense for any violence or assault against a pregnant woman
that interrupts or terminates her pregnancy.").
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disservice to the woman who is injured in the assaultive conduct. The
Lofgren substitute's focus on the injured pregnant woman seems to be a
more effective way to prevent violence against women. At the very least, it
prevents no less violence than does the UVVA, without the controversial
terminology.
During the congressional debates, one opponent mentioned several
additional reasons why the UVVA creates problems for the federal
government and why it should not be passed.!10 Representative Ron Paul, a
conservative Republican, opposed the bill on federalism grounds.'1 ' He
argued that the Congress has no constitutional authority to pass the bill,
which intrudes into a realm of law that was traditionally governed solely by
state mandates:
Of course, it is much easier to ride the current wave of federalizing
every human misdeed in the name of saving the world from some evil

than to uphold a constitutional oath which prescribes a procedural
structure by which the Nation
is protected from what is perhaps the
112
worst evil, totalitarianism.

Representative Paul makes the valid point that as the federal
government usurps additional rights that were formerly reserved for the
States, an important aspect of our federalism-based system is lost." 3 That
is, voting with one's feet; as morals become regulated by the federal
government, a person dissatisfied has no choice but to leave the country or
bear the regulation. It is a gradual change from the system that existed at
the time of the Founding Fathers, where a person out of sync with his
neighbors could move to another state where his views were better reflected
in the legislature. Representative Paul notes that this virtue of federalism
has been long disregarded by the federal government, and114
the UVVA is just
the latest stab in the already-dying doctrine of federalism.

110. See 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 657 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Paul) (arguing that the Unborn Victims of Violence Act would bring the Federal
Government one step closer to "a national police state").
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id. (discussing the Constitution as a method for limiting the Federal
government and the ways in which the UVVA would erode that limit).
114. See 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 657 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Paul) (discussing the continuing expansion of the Federal Government at the expense of
States' rights as it pertains to the Unborn Victims of Violence Act).
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Lastly, there is a risk that pregnant women will suffer legal
ramifications with the passage of the UVVA.1 5 Although proponents
repeatedly point out that the legislation specifically excepts consensual
abortion by the pregnant woman and her doctor, Juley Fulcher of the
16
National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, believes the risk is there.'
She notes that in the states where fetal homicide statutes have been enacted,
some have gone further and expanded the ways that a prenatal entity can be
a victim: "In those states, women have been prosecuted and convicted for
acts that infringe on state recognized legal rights of a fetus." ' 1 7 Ms. Fulcher
foresees a time when women may even be prosecuted for failing to protect
the prenatal entity when a batterer causes injury to her and the entity." 8
Yet even more importantly, there is the risk that a woman who is
emotionally and/or financially reliant on the person who caused the injury
to the pregnancy will not seek medical attention if the pregnancy
miscarries. Such a woman, under the control of her batterer, will keep
away from hospitals and doctors who may have a medical or legal
obligation to contact the police, for fear that her domestic partner will suffer
legal consequences, which in some states can be capital murder." 9 "If
Congress wishes to protect the pregnancy, the way to do that is by
Domestic
protecting the woman,"'120 and the National Coalition Against
2
Violence did not believe that the UVVA protected either.' '

115. See House Hearings on UVVA, supra note 64 (testimony of Juley Fulcher, Esq.)
(describing the possibility of a pregnant woman's liability to the fetus as a result of her
actions during pregnancy).
116. Id. at 38 ("This bill would, for the first time, federally recognize that the unborn
embryo or fetus could be the victim of a crime. It would not be a large intellectual leap to
expand the notion of unborn fetus as victim to other realms.").
117. Id.
118. See id. ("While the Unborn Victims of Violence Act specifically exempts the
mother from prosecution, it is easy to imagine subsequent legislation that would hold her
responsible for injury to the fetus, even for violence perpetrated on her by her batterer under
a failure to protect theory.").
119. See id. at 38-39 (considering the mother's possible liability under the UVVA).
120. Id.
121. See id. at 40-43 (explaining that it is the National Coalition Against Domestic
Violence's position that the Unborn Victims of Violence Act does not protect pregnancy or
women).
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III. Roe v. Wade and its Progeny
The UVVA arises out of the controversy surrounding the right to
choose, which has been debated for more than three decades. 22 The case
that sparked that debate, Roe v. Wade, 123 held that the Constitution provides
124
women with a qualified right to choose to have a pre-viability abortion.
The controversial case determined that part of the liberty of the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 125 -endowed women with
the right to choose. 126 That right was premised upon the Supreme Court's
conclusion that a prenatal entity is not a person, 127 a finding that eliminated
any conflict of interests between two beings equal before the law. Because
a prenatal entity is not a person for purposes of the Due Process Clause, it
2
therefore has no rights to which a born person is entitled. 1
After looking to the locations of the word "person" in the text of the
Constitution, Justice Blackmun determined that the Framers did not intend
the word to include prenatal entities. 129 There are numerous instances:
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contains three references to

"person." The first, in defining "citizens," speaks of "persons born or
naturalized in the United States." The word also appears both in the
Due Process Clause and in the Equal Protection Clause. 130

122. See generally THE ABORTION CONTRoVERSY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Eva R.
Rubin ed., 1994) (outlining the history of the abortion debate in the United States via public
documents).
123. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
124. See id. at 154 ("We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes
the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation.").
125. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1 (declaring that no person shall "be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law .... "); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, §
1 (declaring, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law .... ").
126. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (holding that a woman has a right to an abortion subject
to limited interests of the state).
127. See id. at 157-58 (finding that the Constitution did not include prenatal entities in
the definition of "person").
128. Id.
129. See id. at 158 (examining various sources, Blackmun announced that authority,
"persuades us [the Court] that the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does
not include the unborn").
130. Id. at 157.
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Although those sections are the most important for purposes of the
right to choose, they do not encompass an inclusive list.' 3 ' Justice
Blackmun concluded that in each location, the word person is used in a way
that only applies to an entity that has been born alive. 132 As such, prenatal
entities are not afforded the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
protections of life, liberty, and process 133 that the Constitution gives to
persons. 134
The Court also decided that states, in furthering their compelling
interest in protecting potential life of the prenatal entity, may limit a
woman's ability to seek an abortion only after the fetus is viable; the
interests of the state do not become compelling until the prenatal entity
became viable, defined as having "the capability of meaningful life outside
the mother's womb."' 35 At that point, states could prohibit abortion so long
as there was an exception for the life and health of the woman.131736 In
addition, Roe carefully avoided the murky topic of when life begins.
Since 1973, opponents of the abortion right have attempted to chip
away at the central holding of Roe with various state laws. 38 At first with
little success, opponents continued to try to cabin the Court's newfound
constitutional protection, and in so doing, brought abortion rights into the
limelight. 139 Reproductive issues have practically become the litmus test
131. See id. (discussing the use of "person" in the Constitution). The Court found that
the Constitution also referred to a "person":
in the listing of qualifications for Representatives and Senators ...in the
Apportionment Clause ...in the Migration and Importation provision.. . in the
Emolument Clause... in the Electors provisions ... in the provision outlining
qualifications for the office of President ...in the Extradition provisions... and
the superseded Fugitive Slave Clause... and in the Fifth, Twelfth, and Twentysecond Amendments, as well as in §§ 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id
132. See id. at 157 (finding that no instance of the term "person" "indicates, with any
assurance, that it has any possible pre-natal application").
133. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
134. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 157-58 (holding that the Constitution makes numerous
references to "person," and none could apply to a prenatal entity).
135. Id. at 163.
136. Id. at 163-64.
137. See id. at 159 (stating that the Court need not decide when life begins).
138. See generally Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S.
490 (1989); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
139. See generally Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S.
490 (1989); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
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for Supreme Court nominees,140 and one can hardly remember a
presidential campaign that did not feature the candidate's opinions
supporting either the "right to choose" or the "right to life."
As the post-Roe years went by, the Supreme Court appeared to suggest
that a change of course was coming; some justices seemed ready to modify
Roe in City of Akron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health.14' Justice
O'Connor, in a dissenting opinion, took issue with Roe's holding that life is
only potential at the point of viability. 42 She believed that life is as
43
potential at the point of viability as at any other time in the pregnancy. 1
140. See Linda Greenhouse, Taking a Stand on Confirmation: Senatorial Voices For
and Against Bork, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1987, at B6. Judge Bork was a federal judge serving
on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia when he received his
nomination to the Supreme Court. Id. His views on originality ignited a fierce backfire
from civil rights and women's groups. Id. One of his beliefs was that the Constitution was
never intended to include a right of privacy, and thus, Roe is not constitutional. Id.
141. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 422-25
(1983) (considering the validity of an Akron, Ohio, abortion ordinance that contained
provisions dealing with performance of all second-trimester abortions in a hospital, parental
consent, informed consent, a twenty-four-hour waiting period, and the disposal of fetal
remains). According to the Akron Court, from approximately the end of the first trimester,
the State "may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably
relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health." Id at 430-31. The State's
discretion to regulate, however, does not "permit it to adopt abortion regulations that depart
from accepted medical practice." Id. at 431. The Akron Court held that the ordinance's
hospital requirement of second-trimester abortions is unconstitutional because it imposes a
"heavy, and unnecessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise
accessible, and safe abortion procedure." Id. at 438. The Court finds the informed consent
provision of the ordinance, specifying that a physician counsel the patient, unconstitutional
because there is no valid state interest: "The State's interest is in ensuring that the woman's
consent is informed and unpressured; the critical factor is whether she obtains the necessary
information and counseling from a qualified person, not the identity of the person from
whom she obtains it." Id. at 448. The Court finds the parental consent provision of the
ordinance unconstitutional because it lacks "a procedure by which a minor can avoid a
parental veto of her abortion decision by demonstrating that her decision is, in fact,
informed." Id. at 439. The Court finds the twenty-four-hour waiting period provision
unconstitutional because "Akron has failed to demonstrate that any legitimate state interest is
furthered by an arbitrary and inflexible waiting period." Id. at 450. Finally, the Court finds
the disposal of fetal remains provision unconstitutional because it "fails to give a physician
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden." Id. at 450-51.
142. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 460 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (objecting to Roe's view
that a state does not have an interest in potential human life until the point of viability).
Akron itself dealt with another issue. An Akron ordinance imposed a requirement that all
post-first trimester abortions be performed in a hospital; the Court found that such a
constraint "unreasonably infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an
abortion." Id. at 438 (majority opinion).
143. See id. at 461 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("The choice of viability as the point at
which the state interest in potential life becomes compelling is no less arbitrary than
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Thus, a state has an interest in "protecting potential human life" for the
pregnancy's duration.144
Justice O'Connor's argument has greater weight in the current age of
advanced medical science. Today, doctors are able to provide for the
separate existence of the fetus at a time in the pregnancy when the medical
community used to believe that the prenatal entity was not viable. 145 Just
recently, a child was born at only 21 weeks after conception and,146due to
exceptional medical care, is now healthy and home with her parents.
These continuing advances in neonatal care, as well as stories of the
survival of extremely premature babies, are pushing back the gestation
period traditionally assumed for viability. This could become a concern for
women who may have relied on the fact that they could seek an abortion
after the 21-week mark. If medical science advances to the point where
doctors can deliver and keep alive a prenatal entity at only 15-weeks or
perhaps even 10 weeks, will abortion be prohibited even at that early stage?
Imagine how difficult it would be for a woman in the early stages of
pregnancy, who may not even realize she is pregnant, to obtain an abortion.
It certainly does not seem fair to forbid a woman from seeking an abortion
merely because medicine has advanced so much.
147
Following Akron was Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
which involved a Missouri statute's possible interference with the right to
choosing any point before viability or any point afterward. Accordingly, I believe that the
State's interest in protecting potential human life exists throughout the pregnancy.").
144. Id.
145. See Pat Wingert, The Baby's Who's Not Supposed to Be Alive, NEWSWEEK WEB
EXCLUSIVE (Feb. 23, 2007),
http://www.newsweek.com/id/36697 (last visited Dec. 18,
2008) ("In the 1960s, preemies born around 30 weeks and weighing over three pounds often
died because their lungs were too immature to sustain them. Today, thanks to improved
treatments, the line of viability hovers around 23 to 24 weeks (and 14 ounces) at hospitals
with state-of-the-art intensive care nurseries.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal
of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
146. See id. (describing the circumstances of the exceptional birth of Amillia Taylor).
147. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 490 (1989)
(considering the validity of certain provisions of a Missouri statute regulating the
performance of abortions). Specifically, the Court held that the Court need not pass on the
constitutionality of the statute's preamble; statutory ban on use of public employees and
facilities for performance or assistance of nontherapeutic abortions did not contravene the
Constitution; and the issue of constitutionality of the statute's prohibition on use of public
funds to encourage or counsel women to have nontherapeutic abortions was moot. Id. at
490-92. The Webster Court held that the Court need not pass on the constitutionality of the
statute's preamble because the "preamble does not by its terms regulate abortions or any
other aspect of appellees' medical practice." Id. at 491. The Webster Court additionally
held that the statutory ban on use of public employees and facilities for performance or
assistance of nontherapeutic did not contravene the Constitution because the "Due Process
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seek an abortion. 148 The statute's preamble was inconsistent with Roe's
assertion that "persons" only include those born alive. 149 The preamble
"contain[ed] 'findings' by the state legislature that 'the life of each human
being begins at conception,' and that unborn children have protectable
interests in life, health, and well-being."1 50 It went on to say that unborn
entities are entitled to the same rights as all other persons, subject to any
limitations by the Constitution.' 51 Although these statements appeared to
restrict the right to seek an abortion, the Court viewed the preamble as
merely a "value judgment."'152 The Court did not, therefore, invalidate such
opinion of the state legislature, because it did not have a substantive
54
effect.153 The preamble was merely encouraging childbirth over abortion. 1
Thus, the Court refused
to address the constitutionality of the Missouri
55
statute's preamble. 1
Webster also determined that the statute may require physicians to test
156
for viability of any woman thought to be more than 20-weeks pregnant.
This was significant because a fetus is not presumed to be viable at this
stage of development. 157 Roe had held that a state could not interfere with a
Clauses generally confers no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may
be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government may not
deprive the individual." Id. at 491. Finally, the Webster Court held that the issue of
constitutionality of the statute's prohibition on use of public funds to encourage or counsel
women to have nontherapeutic abortions was moot because this specific provision of the
statute is not being appealed. Id. at 492.
148. See id. at 500-01 (stating that the Missouri statute involved five provisions which
the Supreme Court discussed as being potentially unconstitutional as against the precedent of
Roe).
149. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 ("All this, together with our observation, supra, that
throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far
freer than they are today, persuades us that the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, does not include the unborn.").
150. Webster, 492 U.S. at 501.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 506.
153. See id. at 506-07 (asserting that "the extent to which the preamble's language
might be used to interpret other state statutes or regulations is something that only the courts
of Missouri can definitively decide" and refusing to pass on the constitutional validity of the
statute).
154. See id. at 509 (expressing the view that the state's decision to encourage childbirth
over abortion places no actual burden on a woman's right to choose).
155. See id. at 507 ("We therefore need not pass on the constitutionality of the Act's
preamble.").
156. See id. at 492-93 (stating that the statute is reasonably designed to test viability at
20 weeks to determine whether or not the fetus is viable).
157. See id. at 493 (alluding to the District Court's findings that medical evidence

UNBORN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE ACT
woman's right to seek an abortion until after the fetus was presumed
viable.158 The holding of Roe was losing its constitutional force. 59
The next cut into Roe arose in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.l6 With the dissenting views of Akron now squarely
in the majority, Roe's protection of the right to seek an abortion was
significantly re-shaped.' 6 ' Although Casey dealt with the same exact issue
that the Supreme Court had struck down in earlier cases, the Court had
changed its views since the early days after Roe. Here, the court discarded
Roe's trimester approach and adopted a new test for determining whether a
regulation violated a woman's right to seek an abortion.162 Casey's new
test was the "undue burden" standard. 63 It provided that a statute would be
supports the proposition that a fetus is not viable at 20 weeks).
158. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 ("With respect to the State's important and legitimate
interest in the health of the mother, the 'compelling' point, in the light of present medical
knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester.").
159. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 518 (describing the
rigidity of the Roe framework).
160. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992)
(considering whether the provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 were
constitutional). In holding that a few of the provisions were unconstitutional, the Casey
Court abandons the trimester framework established in Roe v. Wade and adapts the undue
burden standard. Id. The Casey Court ruled that a finding of an undue burden "is a
shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." Id. at
877. Although the Casey Court rejects Roe's trimester framework, the Casey Court upholds
the central holding of Roe that "a State may not prohibit any woman from making the
ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability." Id. at 879. The Casey Court
also upholds the exception requirement of Roe; "Subsequent to viability, the State in
promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even
proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother." Id. at 879.
161. See id. at 876 ("Before viability, Roe and subsequent cases treat all governmental
attempts to influence a woman's decision on behalf of the potential life within her as
unwarranted. This treatment is, in our judgment, incompatible with the recognition that there
is a substantial state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy.").
162. See id. at 872 (describing the new test). The Court stated:
The trimester framework no doubt was erected to ensure that the woman's right
to choose not become so subordinate to the State's interest in promoting fetal
life that her choice exists in theory but not in fact. We do not agree, however,
that the trimester approach is necessary to accomplish this objective. A
framework of this rigidity was unnecessary and in its later interpretation
sometimes contradicted the State's permissible exercise of its powers.
Id.
163. See id. at 877 ("A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that
a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.").
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constitutional so long as it did not have "the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus."' 64 Despite the changes, Casey ultimately affirmed Roe's
basic holdings that a woman has the right to seek an abortion and a prenatal
entity is not a person. 65 Casey's holdings remain the most current
dictations regarding the state of abortion rights.
Stenberg v. Carhart'66 was the next important case; it dealt with a
state statute prohibiting partial-birth abortions.' 67 The Supreme Court
struck down the statute because it included no exception to preserve
the life or health of the pregnant woman.1 68 Considerable medical
evidence showed that a complete ban on the late-term abortion
procedures could result in detrimental harm to pregnant women. 169 In
the face of such evidence and the Court's prior decisions that late-term
abortions must include a life and health exception, the Court struck

164. Id.
165. See id. at 879 ("Our adoption of the undue burden analysis does not disturb the
central holding of Roe v. Wade, and we reaffirm that holding.").
166. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 929-30 (2000) (considering whether a
Nebraska statute banning partial-birth abortion was constitutional). Dr. Leroy Carhart, a
Nebraska physician who performs abortions in a clinical setting, brought a lawsuit seeking
declaration that the Nebraska statute violates the Federal Constitution and asking for an
injunction forbidding its enforcement. Id. at 922. The Stenberg Court held that the statute
was unconstitutional for two independent reasons. First, the Stenberg Court said that the law
lacked any exception "for the preservation of the health of the mother." Id. at 930. Second,
the Stenberg Court said that the statute "imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to
choose a D&E abortion, thereby unduly burdening the right to choose abortion itself." Id. at
930. In reasoning that the statute should contain an exception for the health of the mother,
the court presents evidence that the D&X method of abortion may at times be safer than the
D&E procedure. Id. at 932. Using this evidence, the Court concludes that since the D&X
procedure may at times be the safest and most appropriate, it is unconstitutional that the
statute does not contain a health exception. Id. at 938. In reasoning that the statute is an
undue burden for a woman trying to get an abortion, the Court concludes that the statute
does not only cover the D&X procedure, but it also covers D&E. Id. at 939. Relying upon
this conclusion, the Court rules that because the statute bans the more common D&E
procedure, the statute imposes an undue burden on a woman trying to get an abortion. Id. at
945-46.
167. See id. at 921 (holding that a Nebraska partial-birth ban statute is unconstitutional).
168. See id. at 937-38 ("In sum, Nebraska has not convinced us that a health exception
is 'never necessary to preserve the health of women.' Rather, a statute that altogether
forbids D&X creates a significant health risk. The statute consequently must contain a
health exception.").
169. See id. at 936 ("Especially for women with particular health conditions, there is
medical evidence that D&X may be safer than available alternatives.").
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down the statute. 70 In 2007,
the Court would revisit the issue and this
71
1
statute.
the
uphold
time,
To get around the Court's holding in Stenberg, Congress passed a
federal statute finding that the medical procedure of this particular late-term
abortion is never medically necessary. 172 Upon constitutional challenge,
three different district courts and courts of appeals found that Congress'
findings were unreasonable and struck down the statute. 173 On certiorari at
the Supreme Court, the view was different, however, with two new justices
1 74
appointed by the conservative and pro-life President George W. Bush.
This time, in Gonzales v. Carhart,175 the Court upheld the abortion ban
statute because the majority found that medical uncertainty persists
regarding whether the procedure is medically necessary. 176 Thus, where
170. See id. at 932 ("The State fails to demonstrate that banning D&X without a health
exception may not create significant health risks for women, because the record shows that
significant medical authority supports the proposition that in some circumstances, D&X
would be the safest procedure.").
171. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 1639 (2007) (holding that
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 is constitutional).
172. Editorial, A Shift on Abortions, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2007, at A26 ("After the
court overturned Nebraska's partial-birth abortion ban in 2000 in part because it lacked a
health exception, Congress moved to get around that inconvenience by issuing a legislative
finding that the procedure is never medically necessary.").
173. See id. ("Three separate district courts, upheld by three appeals courts, found that
is was unreasonable and unsupported by medical evidence.").
174. See The Justices of the Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographies
current.pdf (noting that the current president, George W. Bush, appointed Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justice Sam Alito).
175. See Gonzales, 127 S.Ct. at 1614 (considering the constitutional validity of the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003). Id. at 1614. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of
2003 proscribes a particular method of ending fetal life in the later stages of pregnancy. Id.
at 1620. In upholding the Act, the Gonzales Court held that the Act is not void for
vagueness, and that it does not impose an undue burden on a woman's right to abortion
based on its overbreadth or lack of a health exception. Id. at 1625-39. In finding that the
Act is not void for vagueness, the Gonzales Court finds that the Act sets forth "relatively
clear guidelines as to prohibited conduct" and provides "objective criteria" to evaluate
whether a doctor has performed a prohibited procedure. Id. at 1628. In determining that the
Act does not impose an undue burden by imposing overly broad restrictions on secondtrimester abortions, the Court points out the differences between the Act and the Nebraska
statute struck down in Stenberg. Id. at 1629-31. The Nebraska statute was struck down. in
Stenberg partially because it was seen by the Stenberg Court to prohibit the standard D&E
abortion procedure, thereby imposing an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion. Id.
at 1631. The Gonzales Court differentiates the Act from the Nebraska statute struck down in
Stenberg by holding that the Act does not prohibit the standard D&E procedure; "Here, by
contrast, interpreting the Act so that it does not prohibit standard D&E is the most
reasonable reading and understanding of its terms." Id. at 1631.
176. See id. at 1637 ("The medical uncertainty over whether the Act's prohibition
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the issue and there is uncertainty, the Court will
Congress has spoken on
177
defer to the legislature.
Opponents of Roe achieved some success in their attempts to chip
away at the right to choose, 178 though they still have not achieved their
ultimate goal of overturning Roe. Should that occur, the elimination of the
constitutional right to choose would return to the states the ability to
regulate and prohibit abortion. 179 While the most recent late-term abortion
ban is a considerable threat to the right to seek an abortion at any point in
to
the pregnancy,180 it still does not do what the UVVA does, which is
18
provide rights (formerly reserved for born persons) to an unborn entity.'
Opponents of the UVVA believed that the statute was enacted not for
the purpose of protecting women and their pregnancies from violence but
rather, for the purpose of ultimately overturning Roe.1 8 2 Immediately after
the legislation passed the House of Representatives, NARAL Pro-Choice
America issued a press release denouncing the UVVA. 183 The group
opined that the statute's majority had determined "protecting families and
punishing criminals is less important than taking advantage of tragedy to
creates significant health risks provides a sufficient basis to conclude in this facial attack that
the Act does not impose an undue burden."). Note that Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood,
435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006) was consolidated with Gonzales v. Carhart.
177. See id. at 1636 ("The Court has given state and federal legislatures wide discretion
to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.").
178. See Robert Barnes, High Court Upholds Curb on Abortion, WASH. POST, Apr.
19, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/
04/18/AR20070418007 1O.html.
The court's 5 to 4 decision upholding the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act passed
by Congress in 2003 marked the first time justices have agreed that a specific
abortion procedure could be banned. It was also the first time since the landmark
Roe v. Wade decision of January 1973 that justices approved an abortion
restriction that did not contain an exception for the health of the woman.
Id.
179. See Center for Reproductive Rights, What if Roe Fell?, 5 (Sept. 2004),
http://www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/bo whatifroefell.pdf ("A Supreme Court decision
overturning Roe would not by itself make abortion illegal in the United States. Instead, a
reversal of Roe would remove federal constitutional protection for a woman's right to
choose and give the states the power to set abortion policy.").
180. See generally Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003).
181. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
183. See Press Release, NARAL Pro-Choice America, NARAL Pro-Choice America
Opposes Deceptive and Callous Attempt by Congress to Undermine Right to Choose (Feb.
26, 2004), http://www.prochoiceamerica.orglnewslpress-releases/2004/prO22604_uvva.html
(last visited Dec. 18, 2008) (describing NARAL's opposition of the UVVA) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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promote the far-right agenda of trying to rob women of their right to
choose."184 This view was reflected by various congresspersons who
argued during the debates that the bill's language laid a dangerous
foundation for undermining Roe's holding.1 85 Establishing rights for a
prenatal entity and calling it a person is a dangerous precedent to set. No
federal statutes in the past had given a prenatal entity the status of person.
The issue here is that the Supreme Court had previously held that a
prenatal entity is not a person. 186 In this statute, there is a drastic change-a
fetus is now called a person and given rights of a person. 187 That leads me
to believe that a future Congress could pass a statute giving a prenatal entity
even more rights, which then leads to the implication that this entity is now
a person with full rights of a born person. If that is the case, and a person
cannot be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
then a woman cannot choose to abort her fetus. She will be unable to exert
any superior right over another person, and thus, Congress will have
undermined the holding of Roe.
IV. Historicaland Modem Limitationsof PrenatalRights
While there is the very real risk that a prenatal entity will in the near
future gain full personhood status, such a shift has little basis in history.
Legislators who rose in opposition to the UVVA found evidence, looking as
far back as biblical times, indicating that both Judaism and Christianity
1 88 Interpreting Exodus 21:22,189
regarded only those born alive as persons.
Representative Nadler explained that the Bible did not mean to give
"person" status to a prenatal entity.19° Only when the woman is killed as
184. Id.
185. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
187. See 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2004) (creating rights of the unborn).
188. See 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 647 (statement of Rep. Nadler) (referencing the
book of Exodus in the Bible as a historical justification).
189. See id. (reading Exodus). Nadler quoted:
Exodus 21:22 reads as follows: 'If men strive and hurt a woman with child so
that her fruit depart from her,' in other words, she has a miscarriage, they cause
the destruction of the fetus, 'and yet no mischief follow, he shall be surely
punished and he shall pay as the judges determine,' monetary compensation.
'And if any mischief follow, then they shall give life for life.'
Id.
190. See 150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 647 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Nadler) (citing the book of Exodus and stating "this bill, by trying to establish the fetus as a
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result of the assault is an act of murder involved.1 91 Moving into more
recent times, the view of prenatal entities remained the same. 192 Sir Edward
Coke commented that:
[i]f a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or other-wise killeth
it in her wombe; or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dieth in her
body, and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great misprison, and
no murder: but if the childe be born alive, and dieth of the potion,
193
battery, or other caufe, this is murder ....

The words of Sir Edward Coke show that at common law, the killing
of a prenatal entity was not homicide. Rather, for causing the termination
of a pregnancy, an assailant could be punished monetarily (or at least less
severely than had he injured or killed a person). 194 The government could,
however, punish an assailant for homicide if it could prove that there was a
live birth, where
the child died soon after birth of injuries sustained
19 5
prenatally.
In the context of history, which included only persons who were born
alive, states began to enact feticide statutes that punished individuals for
196
injuries to the prenatal entity even when the entity was not born alive.
This change arose in an environment similar to the one we face today, one
where medicine was advancing such that the law needed to change with
it. 197 In the early years of this country, the medical community had been
unable to determine with any certainty when a stillborn baby had died or by
what cause. 198 In some cases, doctors even had difficulty verifying that a

separate person for legal purposes, is a radical departure not only from Anglo-American
legal traditions, but from all of Western legal traditions going way back to the Bible").
191. See id. (discussing acts committed on the unborn and the historical treatment of
such acts).
192. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
193. COKE,INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND Part 3, 50 (1817).
194. See id. (stating the common law's treatment of the termination of the unborn was
something less than murder).
195. See id. (providing that once outside the mother's womb, the child's rights were
protected against murder).
196. See Major Michael J. Davidson, Fetal Crime and Its Cognizabiliiy as a Criminal
Offense Under Military Law, ARMY LAW., July 1998, at 25 n.28 (providing feticide statute
background material).
197. See Colleen Jolicocur-Wonnacott, Comment, The Unborn Victims of Violence Act:
Friend or Foe to the Unborn?, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 563, 569 (2000) (discussing
medical advances and how these advances have interacted the law regarding treatment of the
unborn).
198. See id. (discussing the early medical uncertainty surrounding the unborn).
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woman had been pregnant at all.199 As science improved, states began to
abandon the traditional born-alive rule, 2°° beginning with Massachusetts.2 ° '
Historically, other areas of law have helped to shape views regarding
the rights of prenatal entities. 202 Representative Henry Hyde, a supporter of
the UVVA, believed the statute was not such a departure from previous law
because probate law provides a prenatal entity with interests similar to that
of a born person: "The unborn has legal status in probate matters where a
pregnant woman is an heir or beneficiary and is pregnant and the interests
of the child may be different. So a guardian ad litem is appointed. '' 20 3 I
believe that Representative Hyde was suggesting that if a guardian ad litem
need be appointed, that guardian must be acting in the interests of an entity
endowed with rights. The Congressman's comments also strengthen the
argument that this type of probate situation is not new in regard to the law;
rather, this type of protection for a not yet born entity is commonplace
where the prenatal entity stands to be a beneficiary.
In response, Representative Nadler noted that it is certainly true that as
the prenatal entity develops, it is given greater interests. 20 4 In particular,
after viability, a state may prohibit abortion for the purpose of protecting
the entity's potential life.20 5 However, the Congressman brings the
argument back to the point that although an entity may have an interest, the
true issue here is that "the definition of the fetus or the embryo as a human

199. See Tara Kole & Laura Kadetsky, The Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 39 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 215, 216 (2002) (stating that in the early years of medicine there was no certain
way of determining a pregnancy).
200. See Allison Tsao, Note, Fetal Homicide Laws: Shield Against Domestic Violence
or Sword to Pierce Abortion Rights?, 25 HASTINGS CONS. L.Q. 457, 461 (1998) (discussing
the positive correlation between the improvement in science and states enacting feticide
laws).
201. See Com v. Cass, 467 N.E. 2d 1324 (Mass. 1984) (discussing Massachusetts'
statute that abandoned the traditional born-alive rule).
202. See Blackstone, 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 126 (1765) (stating that other
areas of the law have recognized rights for the unborn).
203. 150 CONG. REC. H637-05-05, 654 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Hyde).
do understand that as the fetus gets older, our law gives it more
204. See id. ("[I]
recognition .... What I am saying is that the definition of the fetus or the embryo as a
human being, as a person, for purposes of law in all respects, which is what this bill would
do, we have never done.").
205. See id. ("[T]he Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade said in the first trimester the interest
of the woman and her choice completely prevails, you cannot regulate abortion. In the
second trimester there is more of an interest, and, therefore you can regulate; and in the third
trimester after viability, you can prohibit abortion.").
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being, as a person, for purposes of law in all respects, which is what this bill
would do, we have never done. "206
In addition to the arguments made during debates, there are a few
other interests that have been afforded prenatal entities in limited
situations. °7 In regard to gifts of inheritance prior to birth, prenatal entities
208
have been able to receive them before they become a born alive person.
As mentioned above, in this context, prenatal entities are also appointed
guardians ad litem.209 This argument supports the conclusions of the
UVVA supporters that if prenatal entities can receive property interests
prior to birth, and property is unable to descend to a non-entity, then the
prenatal entities must be persons. 210 Yet, upon closer inspection, one
realizes that although property may pass to a prenatal entity, it must be
perfected; that means that the inheritance rights are conditioned upon the
prenatal entity being born alive.2 1'
A second area that provides certain limited rights to a prenatal entity is
tort law. Traditionally, persons born alive were barred from bringing
actions for injuries sustained prenatally; however, most courts today permit
such lawsuits in tort.2 1 In addition, there are a few courts that even allow
would-be parents to sue for wrongful death when a prenatal entity is
stillborn.2 13 However, this right is not technically one given to a prenatal
entity that is never born, and appears to be "consistent with the view that
the fetus, at most, represents only the potentiality of life."21 4 Only the
would-be parents benefit in an action to compensate them for the loss of
their potential child.21 5
206. Id.
207. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161-62 (providing prenatal interests background).
208. See supra note 193 (discussing that the common law recognized the right of the
unborn to inherent estates).
209. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 161 ("[U]nborn children have been recognized as acquiring
rights or interests by way of inheritance or other devolution of property, and have been
represented by guardians ad litem.").
210. Note that property cannot pass to an animal, inanimate object, or any other entity
which is not considered alive. Note however, that property can pass to businesses and trusts,
which are considered in some senses to be alive.
211. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162 ("Perfection of the interests involved, again, has
generally been contingent on live birth. In short, the unborn have never been recognized in
the law as persons in the whole sense.").
212. See id. at 161 (discussing tort remedies available for prenatal injuries sustained).
213. See id. (stating potential remedy in some courts for wrongful death involving a
stillborn).
214. Id.
215. See id. (discussing the would-be parent's interests in prenatal life).
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Today at least 34 states 216have begun to enact fetal protection statutes,
although some are more closely analogous to the Lofgren substitute than
the UVVA.217 The majority of the statutes are similar to the UVVA.2 18
These statutes provide that a prenatal entity, for purposes of the statute, is a
person. Pennsylvania's Supreme Court had the opportunity to rule on the
statute's constitutionality in Commonwealth v. Bullock,2 19 where a man was
charged with the strangling murder of his girlfriend and his girlfriend's
unborn child.22 ° Pennsylvania's statute provides that "it is unlawful to
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently cause the death of an
unborn child, defined to include all stages of gestation from fertilization to
live birth.",22' The court, relying on interpretations by other state appellate
courts, determined that the statute is constitutional because it "does not
purport to define the concept of personhood or establish when life as a
human being begins and ends, rather, it imposes criminal liability for the
destruction of a human embryo or fetus that is biologically alive." 222 Thus,
the Pennsylvania prenatal protection statute contains some language similar
216. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin.
217. See National Right to Life Committee, State Homicide Laws that Recognize
Unborn Victims, National Right to Life, Dec. 30, 2006, http://www.nrlc.org/UnbomVictims/statehomicidelaws092302.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2008) (stating the various state
laws and how the loss of prenatal life is treated) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
218. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3452
(2007).
219. See Commonwealth v. Bullock, 913 A.2d 207, 210 (Pa. 2006) (considering the
constitutionality of Pennsylvania's fetal homicide statute, which defined certain deaths of
unborn children as criminal homicide). The case involved the strangling death of a pregnant
female and her unborn child by the woman's boyfriend. Id. Under Pennsylvania statute, the
boyfriend was charged with murder and criminal homicide of the unborn child. Id. The Act
classified the crime of criminal homicide "if he or she intentionally, knowingly, recklessly,
or negligently causes the death of an unborn child ...." Id. The jury eventually convicted
Bullock of voluntary manslaughter regarding the unborn child. Id. at 211. Bullock
challenged the constitutionality of the statute. Id. The statute was upheld as constitutional
because it "does not purport to define the concept of personhood or establish when life as a
human being begins and ends; rather, it imposes criminal liability for the destruction of a
human embryo or fetus that is biologically alive." Id. at 212. Accordingly, the statute and
conviction were constitutionally upheld. id. at 219.
220. See id. at 210 (upholding Pennsylvania's fetal homicide statute).
221. Id.
222. Id.
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to the UVVA because the second crime the accused is charged with is for
causing the death of whatever the thing was in the mother's uterus. The
statute carefully avoids determining that the prenatal entity is a person, yet
still provides punishment to an assailant who causes the woman to
involuntarily abort her pregnancy.223 This statute does not implicate
problems for Roe v. Wade as the UVVA does because it establishes no
personhood status for a prenatal entity,224 yet Pennsylvania's statute is still
not as abortion-neutral as the Lofgren substitute.225 While the federal
substitute provided that the second crime was against the woman for
interfering with her right to choose, Pennsylvania's legislation seems to
provide the prenatal entity with some interest outside of the mother's
interest. 226 Such language is dangerous because it leads one to believe that
endowing a prenatal entity with a few rights now will lead to more and
more rights culminating with an overturning of Roe. As previously
mentioned, there are a number of statutes that are more closely akin to the
Lofgren substitute.2 27 People v. Davis228 is one such California case where
a defendant was charged with murder under a state statute after the assailant
shot the woman causing her to lose so much blood that the fetus was
stillborn.
The California statute is not entirely like the Lofgren
230
229
Here, the second crime is for causing the death of a fetus.
substitute.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id.
Id.
Motherhood Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 2247, 108th Cong. (2003).
Compare Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2004), with
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2601-2609 (1997).
227. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. 35-42-1-6 (West 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. 21-3440 (1994);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (1994).
228. See People v. Davis, 7 Cal. 4th 797, 802 (1994) (considering whether a murder
under the California statute could have been committed on a fetus pre-viability). The
defendant was charged under California statute with murder of a fetus, after the pregnant
woman's fetus died resulting from gunshots during a robbery. Id. at 801. The defendant
argued that he could not be held under the statute because the fetus did not have legal
protection pre-viability, in accord with Roe v. Wade. Id. The court reasoned that when a
mother's privacy interest is not at issue, the legislature could determine when the fetus
should be protected from homicide. Id. at 810. The mother's privacy interest was not at
stake because the mother was not seeking an abortion. Id. Rather, the defendant's interest
were at issue and those interests are not granted the right to choose when to abort the fetus.
Id. Accordingly, the legislature could pass a law protecting the life of the fetus. Id. at 815.
The court upheld the statute. Id.
229. Compare Motherhood Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 2247, 108th Cong. (2003)
(providing Lofgren substitute), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (a) (1970) (specifically
referring to and protecting the fetal entity).
230. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (a) (1970).
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Thus, California's fetal protection statute falls somewhere between the
UVVA, which punishes for causing death to a person and the Lofgren
substitute which punishes for non-consensual termination of a woman's
pregnancy.2 3 1
The California statute provides, "[m]urder is the unlawful killing of a
human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought. ''232 The defendant
argued that the statute could not apply to any fetus that did not meet the
definition of viability under the Roe standard.233 Because a fetus in
California did not gain the status of protected by the state legislature until
viability the defendant argued that the prenatal protection statute also could
not apply to a prenatal entity not yet viable. 234 Essentially, he did not think
the law could charge him with murder of a non-viable fetus, which at the
very same moment, could have been aborted by the woman. The court
determined that there is no requirement of fetal viability to convict a
defendant of murder with malice aforethought.235 California's state
legislature did not specify a requirement of viability, and the court's only
role was to determine if the statute violated the constitutional right to
choose.236 The court held that, "when the mother's privacy interests are not
at stake, the Legislature may determine whether, and at what point, it
should protect life inside a mother's womb from homicide. ,,237 Here, the
mother's interests were not at stake because she was not attempting to abort
the fetus.23 8 The interests at stake here were those of the defendant and he
has no constitutional right to choose whether a woman aborts her
pregnancy.239 As such, the California legislature was free to pass a law
upheld the
pursuant
24 to its interest in protecting fetal life, and the court

statute.

231. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
232. Davis, 7 Cal. 4th at 800-01.
233. See id. at 806 (stating the defendant's argument regarding the constitutionality of
the statute).
234. Id.
* 235. See id. at 810 (ruling that a defendant may be convicted of murder pre-viability).
236. See id. (discussing the court's role in interpreting the statute).
237. People v. Davis, 7 Cal. 4th 797, 810.
238. Id. at 800-01.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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V. Conclusion

Pro-choice advocates have been battling legislation that restricts the
right to seek an abortion ever since the passage of Roe v. Wade. The
UVVA appears to be the most effective statute yet passed by the pro-life
side of the aisle involving a real threat to Roe.
...[T]his bill, H.R. 1997 [the Unborn Victims of Violence Act] ... is

clearly focused at criminalizing the acts of women if they decide to
choose to terminate a pregnancy. And why do I say that? Because what
the bill does is to recognize a member of the species homo sapiens at all
stages of development as a victim of crime from conception to birth.
This attempts to afford a fetus, embryo, and even a fertilized241egg rights
and interests separate from and equal to those of the woman.
Proponents of the UVVA insisted, however, that its purposes were
only to punish criminals for causing injury to the pregnancy, validate the
families' feelings of loss, and prevent violence against pregnant women.242
Yet if that were the case, they should have had no problem accepting the
Lofgren substitute, which served the same goals, but did not recognize a
prenatal entity as a person. 243 By charging the assailant with two crimes
against the pregnant woman, the Lofgren substitute would accomplish the
same purposes but would not take a step toward overturning Roe and the
protections guaranteed thereunder. Punishing the assailant for two crimes
against the woman also seems to be fitting because the woman has suffered
so greatly-first, with an assault and, second, with injury to her fetus or
termination of her pregnancy.
However, the pro-life advocates filled the debates with devastating
244
stories of women who had their pregnancies terminated against their will.

They further claimed that opponents did not care about the women and
families who had suffered such a loss. 245 But that was not the case;
legislators on both sides of the aisle felt sympathy for the families of Laci
Peterson and other women killed in similar circumstances.
As
Representative Jan Schakowsky argued during the debates, "[iut is actually
insulting and certainly annoying that there is some sort of accusation that

241.

150 CONG. REc. H637-05, 645-46 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.

Jackson-Lee).
242.
243.

See supra notes 6, 47-50, 90 and accompanying text.
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.

244. See supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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those of us who think the substitute is preferable do not care about women
246
and do not care about the babies that they are carrying.
Other opponents stood up to announce their desire to punish assailants
who intrude on the private decision of a woman to carry a pregnancy to
term, like Representative Stephanie Jones when she stated that:
We all agree that criminals who attack pregnant women-including
especially heinous attacks aimed at ending the pregnancy-should be
punished for their actions. But... [the UVVA] is not needed to allow
247
the vigorous prosecution of anyone doing harm to a pregnant woman.
All of these statements show that there was an identical sentiment
running through Congress-everyone wanted to punish an assailant who
caused injury to a pregnant woman. That same feeling appears to be
reflected in the general population, as was noted by various legislators
during the debate.248 Women like Karlene Robbins2 49 deserve to have their
attackers punished. Karlene's husband violently beat her after an argument;
physically, she suffered only injuries to her nose, eye, and uterus, but she
suffered more than a physical loss. She was stripped of her right to give
birth to the potential child that she had eagerly waited for. Woman such as
Karlene, without a law that punishes assailants for terminating a pregnancy
against the woman's will, would not feel that justice has been served.
However, justice can be served and Karlene's husband could be convicted
under a statute that is not the death knell for abortion rights. A statute like
that offered by Representative Lofgren vindicates the women who suffer
such a tragedy yet also punishes those who unlawfully terminate a woman's
pregnancy.
Yet since the Lofgren substitute was rejected, it seems clear that the
important aspect was not the purposes as stated during the debate, but
rather, that it was to establish a legal foundation in which a prenatal entity
is given a right of a person. Unfortunately, the bill that passed was the
UVVA, the one that spells trouble for the constitutional right to choose, and
endows prenatal entities with a right formerly reserved to persons born
alive. The UVVA can be used as a foundation to establish personhood for
prenatal entities in other areas of law. That could allow a court to
determine that the prenatal entities, as persons, cannot be deprived of life
246. 150 CONG. REC. H637-05, 642 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Schakowsky).
247. 150 CONG. REc. H637-05,658 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep. Jones).
248. See generally 150 CONG. REc. H637-05 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004).
249. See Tsao, supra note 200, at 458 (detailing the story of Karlene Robbins).
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and liberty without due process of law, according to the dictates of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. If that happens, Roe could be overturned.
While the UVVA appears to be on a collision course with the right to
choose, it seems that the statute itself does not entirely run counter to Roe.
The UVVA establishes only a single right for prenatal entities, i.e., the right
that calls for punishment of the assailant who causes injury or death to the
entity. 25° Returning to the hypothetical situation given at the beginning of
this note, in which one entity had to be sacrificed, the six-year-old, or the
fetus, it seems that if most, if not all, people would choose the rights of the
six-year-old, such choice represents a consensus that the two entities do not
share the same rights. Thus, if two entities do not share the same rights and
one of those entities is clearly a person (the born alive six-year-old), then
that other entity (the fetus) cannot be a person.25'
This argument stems from the American belief that all persons are
equal before the law. The Declaration of Independence would remind us
"that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness. '252 If an entity only has one right, while entities born
alive have the full array of rights, then a prenatal entity cannot be a person
at all. Thus, while the UVVA lays a brick in the road to overturning Roe,
the statute itself does not undermine Roe's proposition that persons only
include those born alive. If and when the Supreme Court does hear the
case, the statute will probably be upheld if there is any similarity to state
court cases dealing with the constitutionality of state prenatal protection
statutes, which were discussed above.
A constitutional challenge would likely involve many different parties,
with interest groups supporting both the right to choose and the right to life.
Proponents of the statute will likely argue that the Court should look to the
post-Roe cases and the Court's willingness to restrict the right to choose so
as to promote the state's interest in protecting potential fetal life. They will
argue that the UVVA is a logical extension. In response, opponents will
probably bring their full arsenal with support from the National
Organization for Women and NARAL Pro-Choice America, groups that
vehemently opposed the UVVA. Their arguments will likely echo
250. See Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1841 (2004)
(prescribing punishment for causing the death of an unborn child).
251. But see Innocent Child Protection Act of 2000, H.R. 4888, 106th Cong. (1999)
(defining unborn child as "a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of
development, who is carried in the womb").
252. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)
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statements made during congressional debates, i.e., that through the years,
while the Supreme Court has restricted the right to choose, the main
holding has remain unchanged. There is a right to an abortion, and that
premise is based upon the notion that prenatal entities are not persons, and
thus, the pregnant woman has the greater interest and may exercise that
interest by choosing to terminate the pregnancy.
Justice Stevens commented on the Supreme Court's views on the
status of a prenatal entity:
No member of this Court has ever questioned this fundamental
proposition. Thus, as a matter of federal constitutional law, a
developing organism that is not yet a 'person' does not have what is
sometimes described as a 'right to life.' This... remains a fundamental
253
premise of our constitutional law governing reproductive autonomy.
Although the fundamental proposition has never before been
questioned by the Court, the UVVA could cause a change of heart. With a
majority of conservatives on the Court, for the first time in over thirty
years, the right to choose appears to be in dire circumstances. The UVVA
has chipped away yet another portion of the right to choose, and it may
open the door to overturn Roe.

253.

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 913-14 (1992).
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